Joshua Black
Postdoctoral Research Fellow

Foreign policy was the dominant issue at the leaders’ press conferences this afternoon. Reports that Russia wants to position aircraft at an Indonesian base in Papua have sent a shockwave through an otherwise dreary day of campaigning.

The Defence Minister is at pains to assure voters that Australia enjoys “a very close relationship with Indonesia”. In carefully coded language, Richard Marles said that Australia had “already been engaged with Indonesia on this request”, and the PM said Australia was “seeking further clarification”.

Within seconds, the issue had taken on a partisan hue. The opposition leader says that if the government did not have forewarning it would amount to “a catastrophic failure” from Albanese and foreign minister Penny Wong. Albanese says the relationship is “never better than it is right now”.

The truth is that Australians do not think often enough, or clearly enough, about Indonesia anymore. But we used to, only a few decades ago.

In the 1990s, Indonesia was absolutely central to Australian foreign policy. The Keating Government worked through 1994 to achieve a security agreement with Indonesia, which was ultimately signed the following year.

The relationship was more complicated in the Howard era, thanks to a series of crises including the Asian Financial Crisis (which threw Indonesia into a deep recession) and the conflict over Timor-Leste’s independence.

Things grew harder in the 2000s and 2010s. Indonesia became a variable in Australia’s difficult asylum seeker policy debate. Indonesia also affronted many Australians with the execution of Australian detainees Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukumaran.

Since then, Indonesia has not loomed quite so large in Australia’s public conversation. That’s clearly to our detriment.

There’s no substitute for clear-eyes strategy in this region, as Russia has sharply reminded us.